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深圳翻译公司关键字：The purpose of state-owned enterprise reform is to establish an effective enterprise system, or that "corporate governance" (corporate governance). Thus, in this article, I put the changes in corporate governance as a standard to evaluate the effectiveness of state-owned enterprise reform and problems, and present some ideas for future reform. My basic argument can be summarized as follows. First, from the perspective of corporate governance, China's state-owned enterprise reform in addressing the incentive mechanism is relatively successful in addressing the operator selection mechanism is unsuccessful, so the next step of reform to address the core problem is that business by selection mechanism; second, the current implementation of "state-owned stock company system" operator selection mechanism can not solve the problem, to solve the problem lies in the country from the "shareholders" (equity-holder) to "creditors" (debt-holder) at the same time opening up direct financing market to private investors from creditors become shareholders; third, non-state enterprises "get involved" state-owned enterprises and the existing managers "buy" (management buyout) is to solve the problem of state-owned enterprises more viable way to . After ten years of reform, China's state-owned enterprises in fact a considerable extent in various forms has been the personal "possession", the next question is how to put this fact into law on possession of "all."
The following article consists of three sections. The first section discusses the corporate governance structure to solve the problem and how to solve these problems, and from this point of evaluation over the past decade the effectiveness of state-owned enterprises; Section II discusses the current implementation of state-owned enterprises 'reform companies' problems; first three proposed state capital to talk about my claims of reform ideas and turn some specific ideas.
Enterprise system to solve the problem and how to solve these problems?Simply put, the enterprise system to solve two problems: First, in a given enterprise is a team production organization in the case, what means that everyone has the enthusiasm to work hard and not lazy; Second, the viability of a given person can not be directly observed in the case, what system to make the most talented people, not stupid, take the operator positions. Enterprise system and how to solve these two problems? From the modern theory point of view, it is through residual claims (residual claim) and control (control rights) to solve the distribution of these two problems. Claims on the company's revenue has two categories, one is not risk-contract income claims, and the other is the risk of residual claims. Control over the distribution refers to who should have decision-making power, who should control who. Through the allocation of residual claims and control, enterprise system is an incentive mechanism to solve the problem, then one is the choice of the operator mechanism. Modern theory of the stresses of business ownership refers to the residual claims and control, it is not the same as with the capital ownership. Owners of capital are not business owners, to see whether he is residual claimant. Generally speaking, there are two types of arrangements, one is the symmetry of the arrangement, such as partnership, residual claims and control over their members in a partnership distribution is symmetric, that we share the risk of mutual supervision. Another non-symmetry arrangement, typical capitalist enterprise is non-symmetrical arrangement, which some people have a residual claim while the other person to receive contract revenue. From this perspective, ownership of enterprises with common Chinese saying, "self" relevant. "Self" and "from" Who? Who is this "self", who is the business owner, although he is not necessarily the property owner. From the principal - agent relationship point of view is the same meaning. Generally speaking, the principal refers to the business owner. Economic sense of the principal means for the conduct of others who take risks. If your behavior affect my interest, then I am the principal, you are an agent. If you affect each other, then each principal and agent.
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