巴彦淖尔翻译公司关键字：government has let them to think about the overall interests, while they also want lower prices is not feasible. Under such circumstances, A, B of the behavior of prices will be terminated.During coordination, A, B are guaranteed to not cut prices, but this agreement is in the competitive market conditions can not be everlasting. They will cut prices by disguised attempt to derive maximum benefit, but the two acts, but also makes the newly established balance is broken, both losses. repeated game. Into a Nash equilibrium in the cycle, the company's price cuts will not be able to get away, in the competitive market conditions, such as prices continued to decline is inevitable, the price becomes repetitive process can not be lower and lower until, that is when the price equal to marginal cost. In repeated games, A, B are the starting point to maximize the benefits, but in such a Nash equilibrium, the overall interests of the falling structure can change the game from two perspectives to consider, first, take the initiative to change the game side, and second, there the parties involved in the new game, forcing the return value of the original side of the game changed. Telecom operators from the business goals, "income" to "profit", the game will change the value of the benefits side, it may no longer meet the "prisoner's dilemma" game model of the two conditions, in order to avoid owning household. According to the characteristics of the telecommunications industry, we assume, choose "no price" strategy, the telecom companies is 30% profit margin, select the "price" strategy, the profitability of the telecommunications business is 20%. Shown in Table 2, the two sides do not cut prices, the profit is 5 × 30% = 1.5; when both prices and profits are 4.5 × 30% = 1.35; price the other party does not lower prices, the price can be 7 square × 20% = 1.4 of the profits, not lower prices can only be 2.8 × 20% = 0.56 of the profits.
3.2 telecommunications regulatory authorities to join the price war may be avoided vicious gamAs mentioned earlier, if the parties involved in the new game, change the structure of the original game, but also may cause carriers to avoid the "prisoner's dilemma", which may avoid owning household.I put the regulatory agency as a party game, and competition tends to lower prices for telecom operators as the other side of the game model was constructed as shown in Table 3, model analysis of a double game operators, regulatory agencies on the